Dignāga classifies inference into two kinds: inference for one's own sake (svārthānumāna) and inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). Inference for one's own sake is the cognition of an object (artha), i.e. the logical consequence to be demonstrated, through a mark (liṅga) which possesses the three characteristics of a valid reason (trairūpya), namely, the three conditions for a valid reason.
The first of the three conditions requires that the reason be present in the subject of inference (dharmin). In order to examine how the reason * I would like to express my thanks to Mr. Roland Playle, who kindly corrected my English, and to the editorial staff of the WZKS.  Research for this article has been made possible by a grant in support of research in a special subject area (International Joint Research) of Waseda University, 2001 University, -2002 1 Cf. PS II 1a'b: ... svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk / (see Kitagawa 1965: 73f.) ; PVin II 1,24-2,2 = SyVR 23, 9 & 12f.: svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk / (= PVin II 1a'b) trilakṣaṇāl liṅgād yad anumeye 'rthe jñānaṃ tat svārthānumānam.
2 Cf. PVin II 1,1-7; Steinkellner 1979: 21, n. 1 and 4, and p. 23, n. 9; Iwata 1995: 155, n. 14. Inference for the sake of others is defined as follows: "On the other hand, inference for the sake of others is [the verbal expression] which manifests the object (i.e. the reason) recognized by [the proponent] himself " (PS III 1ab = PVin III 1ab = SyVR 23,10: parārtham anumānaṃ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam /). Although inference for the sake of others is essentially the cognition of the consequence, i.e. the property to be proved, it is approximately recognized as the verbal expression of the reason. In the process of inference, the cognition of the consequence is the effect which arises from the verbal expression of the reason. On account of the superimposition of the effect onto the cause, i.e. because the cognition of the conclusion as effect is superimposed onto the expression of the reason as cause, inference for the sake of others is regarded as the expression of the reason. present in the subject of inference can fulfil the second and third conditions, Dignāga classifies, in his Wheel of Reasons (hetucakra), the reason into nine types by combining the threefold division of the relationship of the reason to the similar instances (sapakṣa) with the threefold division of the relationship of the reason to the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa), 3 and indicates a method for determining whether the classified reasons are valid or not. 4 Although the theory of the three conditions for a valid reason is already mentioned in the Shun zhong lun attributed to Asaṅga, the above-mentioned classification of the reason into nine types is an original idea of Dignāga's. One of his major contributions to the development of Buddhist logic consists in the following: Rejecting the traditional Indian logical idea that real relations such as contact (saṃyoga) and inherence (samavāya) have to be presupposed as the basis for the estab-3 First, he divides the universe of discourse into the subject of inference, the similar instances (sapakṣa) and the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). The similar instances are a set of cases which are similar to the subject of inference in the sense that they possess the property to be proved (sādhyadharma). The dissimilar instances are a set of cases which do not possess the property to be proved. Second, he divides the relationship of the reason present in the subject of inference to the sapakṣa into three cases: the reason's presence in all of the sapakṣa; the reason's absence in all of the sapakṣa; and the reason's presence only in some of the sapakṣa. In the same way, he divides the relationship of the reason to the vipakṣa into three cases: the reason's presence in all of the vipakṣa; the reason's absence in all of the vipakṣa; and the reason's presence only in some of the vipakṣa. Furthermore, he combines each of the former three cases with the latter three cases. By means of this combination he enumerates nine cases; cf. PSV 2 131a5ff. (= PSV 1 48b5ff.) and Kitagawa 1965: 185ff. & 27ff. These are the nine types of the reason in the Wheel of Reasons. 4 Due to the third condition for a valid reason, namely, the reason's absence in the dissimilar instances, the reason must be absent in the instances which do not possess the property to be proved. This corresponds to the case where the reason is absent in all of the dissimilar instances. On the other hand, according to the second condition, namely, the reason's presence in the similar instances, the reason is not necessarily present in all the similar instances. This corresponds to the cases where the reason is present either in all of the similar instances or in some of the similar instances. The reason present in the subject of inference is valid only when it fulfils both the second and the third conditions. Therefore, the valid reason is of two types in the nine types of the reason: 1) the second type of reason which is absent in all of the dissimilar instances and present in all the similar instances; 2) the eighth type of reason which is also absent in all the dissimilar instances but present only in some of the similar instances. The remaining seven types of reason are fallacious reasons. lishment of a logical relation between reason and consequence, and working only within the logical field, Dignāga explains how the consequence is derived from the reason by means of the examination of the nine types of reason. Via his table of the nine types of reason, he presents a concise method for examining how the second and the third conditions for a valid reason are or are not fulfilled. However, he does not explain the foundation for the establishment of the logical relation, i.e. the pervasion of the reason by the consequence, which is the main factor for the derivation of the consequence. 5 According to Dignāga's trairūpya theory, the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances must be confirmed for the establishment of the derivation of the consequence; but this is practically impossible as no one can examine all dissimilar instances. 6 There thus arises the problem as to what might serve as the basis for a certain derivation of the consequence from a reason. It is Dharmakīrti who solves this problem. He introduces an ontological relation, i.e. essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha), as the basis for the logical relation between the reason and its consequence. It consists of identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti), i. e. in the first case, the object indicated by the reason is the same as the object indicated by the consequence to be demonstrated, and in the second case, the object indicated by the reason is the effect (kārya) of the object indicated by the consequence to be demonstrated. He insists that the derivation of the consequence from the reason is possible precisely because the reason is related to its consequence through the essential connection.
Given that Dignāga's system of logic is interpreted by Dharmakīrti on the basis of his original idea of essential connection, the following question poses itself when we analyze Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's nine types of reason: Which part of Dignāga's theory of the nine types of reason does Dharmakīrti change or improve? It is the purpose of this paper to make clear Dharmakīrti's original view expounded in his Pramāṇaviniścaya (= PVin) on Dignāga's nine types of reason and to extract the characteristic features of Dharmakīrti's logic.
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE INDICATION OF THE NINE TYPES OF REASON
In the programmatic verse in the third chapter of his Pramāṇaviniścaya (= PVin III) Dharmakīrti describes the purpose of the indication of the nine types of reason in the following way: With a view to interpreting the purpose of Dignāga's nine types of reason, Dharmakīrti divides the reasons into three groups: (1) the second and eighth reasons, and the fourth and sixth reasons; (2) the first and fifth reasons; (3) the third, seventh and ninth reasons. In Dignāga's logic (1) the second and the eighth reasons are valid (samyak) reasons; the fourth and the sixth reasons are contradictory (viruddha) reasons; the others are inconclusive reasons: (2) the fifth is an inconclusive (anaikāntika) reason inasmuch as it is "uncommon" (asādhāraṇa), that is, it is present neither in the similar instances nor in the dissimilar instances; the first is an inconclusive reason inasmuch as it is present in all similar and dissimilar instances; (3) and the rest (the third, seventh and ninth reasons) are also inconclusive reasons inasmuch as they are common, that is, they are present in some or in all dissimilar instances. The following table shows Dharmakīrti's division of Dignāga's nine types of reason into three groups: valid reason (the second and eighth reasons) (1) contradictory reason (the fourth and sixth reasons)
(1) inconclusive reason uncommon (the fifth reason) (2) common (the first reason (2) the third, seventh and ninth reasons) (3) Dharmakīrti explains the purpose of the indication of these reasons as follows.
( 1 ) Va l i d R e a s o n s a n d C o n t r a d i c t o r y R e a s o n s In Dharmakīrti's logic, only the reason which possesses an essential connection with its consequence is a valid reason. Essential property as reason (svabhāvahetu) and effect as reason (kāryahetu) possess an essential connection with their consequences and hence make these consequences known (gamaka). However, when these two are formulated for the derivation of the opposite of their intended consequences, they are contradictory reasons. In order to show this, two valid reasons (the second and eighth reasons) and two contradictory reasons (the fourth and sixth reasons) are indicated in the Wheel of Reasons.
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For Dignāga, the valid reason present in the subject of inference consists of two kinds: the second reason which is present in all of the similar instances and absent in all of the dissimilar instances, and the eighth reason which is present in some of the similar instances and absent in all of the dissimilar instances. For Dharmakīrti, the valid reason present in the subject of inference must satisfy the requirement of the essential connection with its consequence and is classified into three kinds: svabhāvahetu, kāryahetu and reason as non-cognition (anupalabdhihetu) . In Dharmakīrti's logic, however, the valid reason consists finally only of svabhāvahetu and kāryahetu, because the anupalabdhihetu is reduced to the svabhāvahetu. Dharmakīrti's standpoint thus differs from that of Dignāga: The former introduces an ontological relation for the ascertainment of the logical relation while the latter ascertains the logical relation within the logical domain. Hence Dharmakīrti's classification of the valid reason itself is also different from Dignāga's. Thus, when interpreting Dignāga's nine types of reason, Dharmakīrti must show the relationship between his own valid reasons and Dignāga's. Dharmakīrti clarifies this relationship as follows. An effect does not always occur when there is a 8 Cf. PVin III 301a5f.: raṅ bźin daṅ 'bras bu dag kho na bdag ñid 'brel pa'i phyir go bar byed pa daṅ / bzlog na phyin ci log tu byed pa yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir / mi rtag ste byas pa'i phyir daṅ / brtsal (D 203b4; btsal P) ma thag tu byuṅ ba'i phyir ro źes bya ba'i gtan tshigs gñis daṅ / rtag ste byas pa'i phyir daṅ brtsal (D; btsal P) ma thag tu 'byuṅ ba'i phyir ro źes 'gal ba gñis bstan to //, and 310a4f.
9 Cf. PVin III 303a6ff. ; Iwata 1991: 86ff. cause (kāraṇa), though there is surely a cause if there is an effect. Therefore, the effect as reason cannot entirely pervade the cause as its consequence. In other words, it is impossible that the reason as effect (kāryahetu) is present in all of the similar instances; it is present only in some of the similar instances and absent in others. 10 The kāryahetu thus does not correspond to Dignāga's second reason which is present in all similar instances; it corresponds only to Dignāga's eighth reason which is present only in some of the similar instances. Therefore, the kāryahetu is necessarily the eighth reason. The stock example of the eighth reason is "being something which follows immediately upon effort" (prayatnānantarīyakatva), i.e. "being caused by effort", for the derivation of the consequence "non-eternity" of sound. When in this case what is caused by effort is interpreted as a cognition caused by effort, then this cognition of sound is an effect arising from non-eternal sound as cause and hence is regarded as a kāryahetu for the derivation of the consequence "non-eternity" of sound. On the other hand, when this property "being caused by effort" is interpreted as an essential property of sound, it is regarded as a svabhāvahetu for the derivation of the same consequence "non-eternity" of sound. Viewed from the angle of the eighth reason, it is a kāryahetu as well as a svabhāvahetu. In contrast to the kāryahetu, which is present only in some of the similar instances, the svabhāvahetu can also be present in all the similar instances. An example of the latter is Dignāga's second reason "being produced" (kṛtakatva) for the derivation of the consequence "non-eternity" of sound, for the properties "being produced" and "non-eternity" imply each other reciprocally. Since both "being produced" and "noneternity" are essential properties of sound, the second reason "being produced" is a svabhāvahetu. Accordingly, the second reason corresponds only to the svabhāvahetu; the eighth reason corresponds to the svabhāvahetu and the kāryahetu: ( 2 ) I n c o n c l u s i v e R e a s o n s ( T h e F i r s t a n d F i f t h R e a s o n s )
As for the first and fifth reasons, opponents of Dignāga's view argue that the first is a valid reason which satisfies only the requirement of the positive concomitance (kevalānvayin) and that the fifth is a valid reason which satisfies only the requirement of the negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin). According to Dharmakīrti's interpretation, the first and fifth reasons are indicated in the Wheel of Reasons in order to reject such objections because doubt (saṃdeha) exists as regards the reason's presence in similar instances and its absence in dissimilar instances. 13 This idea is not mentioned in Dignāga's descrip- 12 On the correspondence of Dharmakīrti's valid reasons to Dignāga's valid reasons, see Ono 1985: 82ff. 13 As for Dharmakīrti's argument against kevalānvayin and kevalavyatirekin reasons, see Ono 1987: 10f., and 1999: 304ff.;  tion. As will be shown, Dharmakīrti is responsible for the introduction of the concept of doubt regarding the establishment of the concomitance.
( 3 ) I n c o n c l u s i v e R e a s o n s ( T h e T h i r d , S e v e n t h a n d N i n t h R e a s o n s )
The rest (the third, seventh and ninth reasons) are indicated to show that the exclusion (vyāvṛtti) of the reason from all dissimilar instances is the principal factor (pradhāna) for the derivation of the consequence from the reason.
14 Although this idea is not clearly mentioned in Dignāga's explanation, it was accepted by him. 15 One observes that according to Dignāga's logic the statement that the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances is the principal factor for the derivation of the consequence does not hold when the fifth reason is taken into consideration since the fifth reason is inconclusive even though it fulfils the condition of the reason's absence in all dissimilar instances; 16 however, since in the interpretation of the purpose of the indication of the third, seventh and ninth reasons the fifth reason is excluded, the statement that these three remaining reasons show exclusion as the principal factor does hold according to Dignāga's logic. We shall have occasion to analyze how Dharmakīrti demonstrates his view that the exclusion of the reason from the dissimilar instances is the principal factor for the derivation of the consequence.
II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF INCONCLUSIVE REASONS
In the Wheel of Reasons the second and eighth reasons are valid, while the fourth and sixth reasons are contradictory. These reasons are indicated in the Wheel of Reasons, according to Dharmakīrti's above-mentioned interpretation, for the purpose of establishing the view that 14 Cf. PVin III 310a6: gtan tshigs kyi (P; kyis D 212b3) ldog pa gtsor sgrub (P; bsgrub D) pa'i phyir phyogs kyi chos rnam pa gsum bśad do // ('di ltar rjes su 'gro ba'i sgo nas ni gtan tshigs go bar byed pa ma yin te / mi rtag pa ñid las rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ma yin pa ñid mi rtogs pa'i phyir ro //); PVP 368b2. 15 In his PSV 2 135a1-3 (= PSV 1 51b8-52a2, ad PS III 30cd-31a), Dignāga insists that the ground for the derivation of the consequence from the reason consists in the exclusion of the reason from the dissimilar instances; cf. Iwata, op. cit. (n. 13), I.
16 Cf. PS II 6cd-7, PSV 2 111b3-8, Kitagawa 1965: 102f., Ono 1999: 303, n. 8, and Iwata, op. cit. (n. 13), IV. svabhāvahetu and kāryahetu are valid reasons. The other reasons are inconclusive. In order to classify the inconclusive reasons, Dharmakīrti makes use of the differentiation between ascertainment (niścaya) and non-ascertainment with respect to the establishment or non-establishment of the reason's presence in similar instances and the reason's absence in dissimilar instances. According to this differentiation, we can be certain that the valid reasons are present in similar instances and absent in dissimilar instances, and we can be certain that the contradictory reasons violate these two conditions, but we cannot always be certain that the inconclusive reasons are present in similar instances and absent in dissimilar instances. Therefore, the ascertainment of the reason's presence and absence cannot be a criterion for determining the inconclusiveness of the reason. In consequence, Dharmakīrti insists that the ground for the inconclusiveness of the reason is not the ascertainment but the doubt of the derivation of the consequence from the reason: This passage shows why Dharmakīrti claims that the ground for the inconclusiveness of the reason does not consist in the ascertainment of the reason's presence and absence in similar or dissimilar instances, but simply in the doubt about the derivation of the consequence. The original idea of doubt stems from Dignāga's description of the inconclusive reasons: Dharmakīrti's unique notion of doubt being the ground for inconclusiveness of the reason can be seen in his argument of the uncommon reason as inconclusive. As regards doubt about the derivation of the consequence from the uncommon inconclusive reason, Dignāga states that the uncommon inconclusive reason, which is, according to his logic, absent both in the similar and dissimilar instances, is a cause of doubt as to whether an intended consequence or the contrary to it is derived.
19 Dharmakīrti conceives his idea about doubt concerning the derivation of the consequence from the uncommon reason on the basis of Dignāga's description of the uncommon reason as a cause for doubt. Furthermore, he asserts that the uncommon reason is doubtful as regards both its occurrence (vṛtti) in that which has the property to be proved and its exclusion (*vyāvṛtti) from that which does not have the property to be proved. His view of doubt concerning the presence and exclusion of the uncommon reason, however, is not expressed directly in Dignāga's relevant explanation of the uncommon inconclusive reason. Dharmakīrti therefore differs in view from Dignāga about the interpretation of the uncommon reason since while according to Dignāga's description of the fifth reason, i.e. the uncommon inconclusive reason, this reason is absent both in the similar and dissimilar instances, Dharmakīrti raises doubt about the certainty of the reason's absence in the similar and dissimilar instances.
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In consequence, Dharmakīrti changes the meaning of being uncommon for the reason: the uncommon inconclusive reason is doubtful as regards the derivation of the consequence because doubt arises both as to the reason's presence in things possessing the intended property to be proved and as to the reason's exclusion from things which do not possess this property. The main ground for this doubt is that, firstly, there is no definite cognition of the reason's presence in either of the alternatives, and secondly, the mere non-perception (adarśanamātra) of the 19 Cf. PSV 2 133a3 (= PSV 1 50a6f.) = PVBh 629, 13f.; see Katsura 1979: 74 and Iwata, op. cit. (n. 13), n. 33. 20 Cf. PVin II 7,14ff. (Steinkellner 1979: 38 and Iwata, op. cit. [n. 13] , IV1.1) and PVin III 299b8ff. (Iwata, ib., n. 35). uncommon reason in the dissimilar instances is not sufficient to establish the exclusion of the reason from these instances. 21 Here it is clear that according to his interpretation the uncommon reason is ascertained neither as regards its absence both in the similar and dissimilar instances nor as regards its presence in the dissimilar instances; rather, it is uncertain as to which of the alternatives the reason is present in. Since there are inconclusive reasons which are doubtful as regards their presence or absence in the instances, Dharmakīrti bases the inconclusiveness of the reason not on the ascertainment of the reason's presence or absence in similar and dissimilar instances, but on the doubt of the reason's presence in things possessing the property to be proved and its absence in things which do not possess the property to be proved.
In this way Dharmakīrti consciously makes use of the concept of doubt in his description of inconclusive reasons. Now a question arises. Why does he introduce this doubt into the description of the uncommon inconclusive reason? The main motive for it can be ascribed to his refutation of an opponent's claim. The Naiyāyikas formulate a specific inference in order to be able to prove the existence of the eternal self (ātman): A living body (jīvaccharīra) possesses a self (sātmaka) because it possesses breathing (prāṇa) etc.
22 They maintain that this reason "possession of breathing etc." fulfils only the condition of negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin), i.e. the absence in the dissimilar instances, on the ground that -since the self is not existent for the Buddhist opponents -similar instances which possess a self are not existent; no property can be absent in a locus which is not existent. Thus the reason "possessing breathing etc.," cannot be absent in the non-existent similar instances; therefore, it is absent merely in the existent dissimilar instances. 23 They hold that the existence of the eternal self is proved with this argument. Dharmakīrti holds the argument to be unsound. In order to refute this claim he emphasizes that there is doubt as to whether their reason is absent in the dissimilar instances only. One of his main arguments is that when the subject under discussion is an object like ātman which is beyond the domain of the senses (viprakṛṣṭa), no one can definitely say that the reason is present in things which 21 Cf. Iwata, op. cit. (n. 13), IV 1.1-3 and IV 2.1 (see also n. [35] [36] As Dharmakīrti considers this doubt about the reason's presence in things possessing a self and its absence in things not possessing a self indisputable ground for the refutation of the Naiyāyikas' inference of the eternal self, he feels it necessary to reinterpret the inconclusive reasons from the aspect of doubt. He thus introduces his own classification of the inconclusive reasons by means of adding the aspect of doubt to the combination of the positive concomitance (anvaya), i.e. the reason's presence in the similar instances, with the negative concomitance (vyatireka), i.e. the reason's absence in the dissimilar instances. The inconclusive reasons are classified as follows: both anvaya and vyatireka are doubtful; either anvaya or vyatireka is doubtful; vyatireka is reversed, namely, unestablished.
25 These inconclusive reasons are treated in detail in the context of his presentation of fallacious reasons. In examining this let us take a look at the examples for each case.
The previously mentioned inference is presented as an example of inference from a reason with doubtful anvaya and vyatireka: A living body possesses a self because it possesses breathing etc. Both the anvaya and vyatireka of this reason are doubtful because, although breathing as the reason must be present either in things possessing a self or in things not possessing a self, there is no ascertainment as to the reason's presence in either of the alternatives.
Let us employ the following mode of presentation: subject: (reason → consequence).
"subject" stands for the subject of inference. "(reason → consequence)" stands for the pervasion of a reason by its consequence. The colon denotes that the reason is formulated with respect to the subject. The above-mentioned inference described may thus be: man: (speakerness → omniscience).
In this case the anvaya, i.e. the presence of "being a speaker" as reason in the similar instances possessing "omniscience", cannot be ascertained because it is doubtful whether one who is omniscient is a speaker or not, on the ground that omniscience is beyond the domain of the senses (viprakṛṣṭa).
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The following inference is formulated as an example of inference from a reason which does not fulfil the condition of exclusion from all dissimilar instances: Sound is non-eternal because it is an object of correct cognition (prameyatva): 28 sound: (being an object of cognition → non-eternity).
The reason "being an object of correct cognition" does not fulfil the condition of exclusion from all dissimilar instances because both eternal things and non-eternal things can be objects of correct cognition. The Naiyāyikas object to this and claim that this reason satisfies only the requirement of the anvaya because, given that the dissimilar instances are eternal things which are not existent for the Buddhist opponents and no property can be present in non-existent things, the reason "being an object of cognition" is not present in the non-existent dissimilar instances, and exists only in the existent similar instances. According to Dharmakīrti's programmatic verse (see above, p. 228) interpreting the purpose of the indication of the third, seventh and ninth reasons, the purpose of indicating these reasons in the Wheel of Reasons is to show that the vyatireka, i.e. the exclusion of the reason from all of the dissimilar instances, is the principal (pradhāna) factor for the derivation of the consequence. This determination of vyatireka as the principal factor for the derivation of the consequence provides an important clue for the ascertainment of the most fundamental factor as 30 On Dharmakīrti's classification of fallacious reasons, see Ono 1987: 8-14. regards the logical pervasion of the reason by the property to be proved. Dignāga also notices its importance, but does not treat it in any detail. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, takes it up for discussion in his interpretation of the indication of inconclusive reasons. His conclusion is drawn from the negation of the cases where the exclusion of the reason from all dissimilar instances is not principal, i.e. from the confirmation that consequences cannot be derived from reasons which do not fulfil the condition of exclusion from all dissimilar instances. In his interpretation Dharmakīrti sets forth three types of inconclusive reasons:
31 (a) the reason which fulfils only the condition of presence in similar instances (anvaya), for example, the seventh reason in the Wheel of Reasons, "non-eternity" for the thesis "sound is not caused by effort" (aprayatnānantarīyaka), (b) the reason which fulfils the condition of presence in similar instances and of absence in dissimilar instances (vyatireka) in the same (sama) form, for example, the ninth reason, "intangibleness" (asparśatva) for the thesis "sound is eternal", and (c) the reason whose presence in the similar instances is principal, that is, for which the anvaya and not the vyatireka has decisive force, for example, the third reason "non-eternity" for the thesis "sound is caused by effort".
Before analysing Dharmakīrti's interpretation it should be noted that the terms anvaya and vyatireka do not refer to the logical relation of the pervasion of the reason by the property to be proved and the contrapositive logical relation, but rather respectively to the reason's presence in similar instances and its absence in dissimilar instances; in this context anvaya and vyatireka are thus mutually independent. As for the reason's presence in similar instances and its absence in dissimilar instances, Dignāga introduces two cases for each in his classification of the reason into nine types: the reason's presence only in some similar instances and its presence in all similar instances, and the reason's absence only in some dissimilar instances and its absence in all dissimilar instances. The term anvaya in this context refers to the reason's presence only in some of the similar instances and the term vyatireka refers to the reason's absence in some of the dissimilar instances. In order to denote the cases of the reason's presence in all similar instances or its absence in all dissimilar instances, the word "principal" (pradhāna) is used; for example "the anvaya is principal".
(ad a) When the vyatireka is not the principal factor for the derivation of the consequence, for instance, when a reason satisfies only the anvaya, then this reason is inconclusive because a consequence cannot be derived from a reason for which there is presence merely in some similar instances since this reason can be present in dissimilar instances: An example of the reason which fulfils the demand for presence in similar instances is the seventh reason in the Wheel of Reasons, namely, "non-eternity" for the thesis "sound is not caused by effort":
sound: (non-eternity [seventh reason] → not being caused by effort).
The reason "non-eternity" is inconclusive because it is present also in dissimilar instances which are caused by effort, for example non-eternity is present in a pot which is caused by effort. Accordingly this kind of reason which fulfils only the condition of presence in some similar instances cannot be a valid reason.
(ad b) Dharmakīrti presupposes an objection: the above-mentioned reason is inconclusive, since it, though satisfying the anvaya, lacks the other condition, namely, the vyatireka, the reason's absence in dissimi- reason's presence in similar instances and its absence in dissimilar instances. He refutes this objection as follows: if the reason here would be a valid reason, it would then follow that the ninth reason which is both present and absent in similar and dissimilar instances would be a valid reason. 35 An example of the ninth reason is "intangibleness" for the thesis "sound is eternal": sound: (intangibleness [ninth reason] → eternity).
The reason "intangibleness" is present only in some eternal things (the similar instances), e.g. ether, being eternal, is intangible, whereas an atom, though eternal, is not intangible, and it is absent also only in some non-eternal things (the dissimilar instances), e.g. a pot, being noneternal, is not intangible, while karman, though non-eternal, is not non-intangible, i.e. is intangible. Thus, as regards the ninth reason, the form of the presence in the similar instances and that of the absence in the dissimilar instances are the same, but it is inconclusive. Therefore, the sameness of the form of the reason's presence in the similar instances and its absence in the dissimilar instances is not the decisive factor in determining the validity of the reason.
(ad c) Another objection may be raised: the ninth reason is inconclusive because it is present in some similar instances and absent in some dissimilar instances, 36 but not present in all similar instances, namely, because the anvaya is not principal. 37 This objection implies that simply because the anvaya is principal the reason is valid. This is also rejected reason's presence in the similar instances) has decisive force (*balavat); [on the contrary] the vyatireka (the reason's absence in the dissimilar instances) has little force (*durbala), for example, [in the inference] "sound is caused by effort, because it is non-eternal" [the reason "noneternity", namely, the third reason in the Wheel of Reasons, pervades all things caused by effort as the similar instances; hence the anvaya of this reason is prevalent. However this reason is inconclusive, because it is present in some dissimilar instances].
The objection that the anvaya is principal means on the one hand that the presence of the reason in similar instances is prevalent with respect to the capacity to derive its consequence, i.e. it is a sufficient condition to derive its consequence, and on the other hand that the presence of the reason in similar instances has decisive force with respect to the mode of the reason's presence, namely, the reason is present in all similar instances. However, this objection does not hold, since despite the decisive force of the anvaya, the reason is inconclusive, like the third reason in the Wheel of Reasons, i.e. "non-eternity" for the derivation of the thesis "sound is caused by effort":
sound: (non-eternity [third reason] → being caused by effort).
The reason "non-eternity" is present in all similar instances which are caused by effort, and thus fulfils the condition that it pervade all similar instances. However, it is inconclusive because it does not fulfil the condition of absence in all dissimilar instances, for it is present in a dissimilar instance, i.e. the non-eternity present in lightning which is not caused by effort.
Pointing out that no consequence can be derived from the above-mentioned three types of inconclusive reasons, Dharmakīrti summarizes his arguments: What then is the prevalent condition for the derivation of the consequence? For Dharmakīrti, the consequence can be derived from the reason when the vyatireka is principal, i.e. when the reason is absent in all dissimilar instances, whereas the condition that the anvaya is principal is not always necessary: The eighth reason "being caused by effort" for the thesis "sound is noneternal" is absent in all eternal things which constitute the dissimilar instances; hence the vyatireka is principal, but the reason does not entirely pervade non-eternal things which constitute the similar instances. For example, "being caused by effort" is absent in lightning which is non-eternal; hence the anvaya is not principal. It is, however, a valid reason, not a fallacious one.
By way of his refutation of these possible objections, Dharmakīrti concludes that the indispensable condition for the derivation of the consequence is not the mere presence of the reason in similar instances, but the exclusion of the reason from all dissimilar instances: Dharmakīrti's assertion that the main condition for the derivation of a consequence from a reason consists in the exclusion of the reason from all dissimilar instances implies his criticism of the objection that the mere perception of the reason in the similar instances (darśanamātra) is a sufficient condition for the derivation of a consequence from a reason. 42 Dharmakīrti is of the view that even though the reason is seen once in a similar instance, it still cannot be determined as a valid reason since doubt arises as to whether it is present in the opposite of the consequence, and therefore, in order to avoid this doubt, the exclusion of the reason from all of the dissimilar instances is necessary. [In this case the reason "being caused by effort"] is the factor which 42 As for Dharmakīrti's view against the objection that perception of the coexistence of the reason and the property to be proved can establish the logical relation between them, see PV I 31: kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt //. For a detailed exposition of the background of his view and a translation of this verse -and especially for a discussion of the term svabhāva understood as "essence" as opposed to "identical relation", and of the term avinābhāva-niyama understood as a genitive tatpuruṣa ("restriction of the inseparable connection [to ...]"), not as a karmadhāraya -, see Steinkellner 1997: 627ff. 43 PVBh 645, [17] [18] [19] [20] According to Prajñākaragupta, the perception of the reason in similar instances leads to the derivation of a particular consequence which is experienced, but not to the ascertainment of others which will be perceived later; therefore, this kind of perception does not generally make its consequence known.
He refutes on the same ground the objection that the exclusion of the reason from dissimilar instances can be ascertained by the presence of the reason in similar instances: Since the ascertainment of the derivation of the consequence through the perception of the reason and the property to be proved in similar instances is restricted only to the experienced consequence, there always remains doubt about the derivation of the consequence yet to occur, no matter how often the relation between the reason and the consequence is experienced. Probably Prajñākaragupta's argument against perception as the ground for the ascertainment of the logical relation includes a criticism of Kumārila, who claims that the pervasion of the reason by the consequence is cognized by repeated perception (bhūyodarśana).
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IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF ANTINOMIC REASONS (VIRUDDHĀVYABHICĀRIN)
The fifth reason in the Wheel of Reasons is inconclusive because it is present neither in similar instances nor in dissimilar ones. A stock example for the fifth reason is "audibility" for the thesis "sound is eternal":
sound: (audibility [fifth reason] → eternity).
Since only sound is audible, "audibility" as the reason is present only in sound as the subject of inference and not in other instances, either in similar or in dissimilar instances, it is, therefore, called the uncommon (asādhāraṇa) inconclusive reason. Audibility is inconclusive because no ascertainment can be attained as to whether it is present in eternal or non-eternal things. Dignāga takes this fifth reason "audibility" as an example of antinomic (viruddhāvyabhicārin) reasons, i.e. reasons which derive mutually contradictory consequences and do not deviate from the derivation of their consequences. In PS III the antinomic reasons are alluded to in the following context: Subsequent to the explanation of his theory of the nine types of reason, Dignāga adds that in the case of the determination of whether a reason is valid, inconclusive or contradictory, an examination must be made with respect to only one reason, not more. The inference of the non-eternity of sound from the reason "being produced" is well known to the Buddhists. The other reason "audibility" for the thesis "sound is eternal" is formulated by an opponent who makes use of the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. Dignāga presupposes the objection that the latter could be regarded as valid on the presumption of their theory:
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If in this case (of examining whether "audibility" is a cause for doubt or not) the eternal soundness (śabdatva) is accepted, then this (audibility) could be precisely a [valid] reason.
According to the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, soundness as an universal (sāmānya) inheres in every sound as an individual quality, and is different from sound individuals in that it is both audible and eternal. In reliance on this soundness as an example for the reason's presence in some similar instances, the opponent may insist on the validity of the reason "audibility": the first condition for a valid reason is fulfilled since "audibility" is also present in the subject of the inference "sound", that is, it is present in soundness, too, and hence not restricted only to the subject of inference; the second and third conditions are also fulfilled: the reason "audibility" is present in some eternal things, the similar instances, i.e. in soundness, and absent in non-eternal things, the dissimilar instances. In Dignāga's nine types of reason the ground for the fallacy that the fifth reason "audibility" is uncommon is ascribed 47 PSV 2 132a4f. (= PSV 1 49b3 [ad PS III 23b]): gaṅ gi phyir bśad pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi 'gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthoṅ ste / dper na byas pa daṅ mñan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa dag ñid la the tshoms za ba bźin no // (Kitagawa 1965: 495,8ff .; for the Japanese translation cf. ib., p. 194).
48 PSV 2 133a5 (= PSV 1 50a8) = PVBh 646, 25f.: yadā tarhi śabdatvaṃ nityam abhyupaiti tadāyaṃ hetur eva syāt. The passages which are cited in this chapter (PSV 2 133a5ff.) have been translated into Japanese in Kitagawa 1965: 203f. As for the citation of these passages in NMu (PSV 2 133a5-b1 = NMu Taishō 32,2b20-26 & 2b29-2c1), see Kitagawa's notes and Katsura 1979: 77f. to the fact that except for the subject "sound" itself, there is nothing that is audible, and hence "audibility" cannot be present in things possessing "eternity" as the property to be proved. In this case, however, in addition to the subject there is an instance, soundness, which is both audible and eternal; it is therefore possible to avoid the fallacy that the reason is uncommon. Now the question is how Dignāga treats the antinomic reasons. He concedes that the reason "audibility" may be assumed to be valid only when the other reason "being produced" for the thesis "sound is noneternal" is not formulated: 49 If, with respect to the (subject "sound"), no one would formulate also [other] reasons such as "being produced" for [the derivation of the consequence] "non-eternity", [the reason "audibility"] could be [an establishing factor for the thesis "sound is eternal"].
On the other hand, he admits that when two reasons from which mutually contradictory consequences are drawn are formulated in regard to the same subject of inference, then these reasons are a cause for doubt: 50 Suppose, however, that [with respect to the same subject] two (reasons, i.e. "audibility" for the derivation of eternity of sound and "being produced" for the derivation of non-eternity of sound) are recognized, [these reasons] are a cause for doubt, for it is impossible that in the same thing contradictory (properties) [exist] .
Thus, according to Dignāga's explanation in his theory of the nine types of reason, the antinomic reasons are set forth as a kind of fallacious reason which causes doubt about the derivation of its consequences: In the Wheel of Reasons fallacious reasons are classified into two types: contradictory reasons which are free from doubt, and doubtful reasons. 52 Since fallacious reasons in the Wheel of Reasons are either contradictory or inconclusive, doubtful reasons are nothing but inconclusive reasons. As antinomic reasons are included under doubtful reasons, they are also inconclusive reasons. Thus, Dignāga takes the position that antinomic reasons are a subset of inconclusive reasons.
On the other hand, it seems that he thinks that the problem of antinomic reasons can be solved when the reasons are formulated on the basis of the valid means of cognition, since he is of the view that when one examines theses which are asserted on the basis of the testimony of other schools, the decision whether these are true or not must be made in conformity with testimony which is not in contradiction to direct perception (pratyakṣa): However, he does not claim the impossibility of the antinomic reasons.
Dharmakīrti, treating the problem of antinomic reasons which effect the derivation of mutually contradictory consequences without deviation, draws the conclusion that antinomic reasons are impossible in reality. Generally speaking, this conclusion relies on Dignāga's view 52 Cf. PS III 26 = PSV 2 133a8-b1 (= PSV 1 50b2f. = NMu 10): gaṅ yaṅ phyogs chos mthoṅ ba las // śes par 'dod la bzlog pa yis // gnod pa byed daṅ dpyod thob pa // de las gźan pa rtags mthuṅs med // (Kitagawa 1965: 499,5ff.) In Dharmakīrti's system of logic, the non-deviating reason is of three types: svabhāvahetu, kāryahetu and anupalabdhihetu. Only these three reasons do not deviate as regards the consequences derived from them because they fulfil the three characteristics of a valid reason which are ascertained by the ontological relation, i.e. the essential connection between real things. The essential connection consists of identity and causality. Identity means that the object indicated by the reason is always the object indicated by the property to be proved; causality means that the object indicated by the reason is a different thing from 54 PVin III 327a3f.: dṅos po daṅ rjes su 'brel pa'i rjes su dpag pa la ni ji ltar 'gal ba dag gcig la mi srid pa de bźin du / des khyab pa dag kyaṅ yin pa'i phyir / de dag gcig la yod pa ma yin te / des na de la 'gal ba mi 'khrul pa (P; ba D 228a4) the object indicated by the property to be proved, the former being an effect of the latter. Identity and causality are not mutually contradictory, for identity is a relation between non-different things, and causality is a relation between different things. Since the bases for the validity of the reasons are not mutually contradictory, the consequences derived from them are also not contradictory. Thus, since the reason as non-cognition, as mentioned before, is reduced to the reason as essential property, and the reason as essential property and the reason as effect are ascertained respectively by identity and causality which are not contradictory, their consequences cannot be contradictory. Further, apart from these three kinds of reason there are no other valid reasons. As a result, it is impossible that reasons, though mutually contradictory, do not deviate as regards the consequences derived from them. Thus, Dharmakīrti differs in opinion from Dignāga about the treatment of antinomic reasons: Relying on essential connection as the ground for the validity of the reason, Dharmakīrti does not accept antinomic reasons as inconclusive reasons, while Dignāga counts them as such.
From the above argument it is clear that Dharmakīrti does not accept antinomic reasons within his own logical system. However, a problem remains unsolved. As no one can deny the empirical fact that situations occur in which such reasons are employed, Dharmakīrti has to explain how these situations come about. The answer is given in his explanation of why Dignāga propounds antinomic reasons:
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[In the inference functioning on the basis of the essential connection between real things reasons cannot be antinomic.] Therefore, [Dignāga] propounds [a view] that antinomic [reasons] are a fault of the proving factor (sādhanadoṣa), when, in dependence upon the inference which functions by means of the non-perception of real things (avastudarśana) and is in conformity with verbal testimony, [a proponent] examines objects of this (verbal testimony which are beyond sense cognitions).
In order to examine objects which are beyond the sphere of sense cognitions, a proponent may formulate an inference in which the three conditions for the validity of the reason are established only on the basis of verbal testimony, but not on the basis of a valid means of 56 PVin III 326a4f.: de'i phyir dṅos po ma mthoṅ ba'i stobs kyis źugs pa (D 227a4; pa la P) luṅ la brten pa'i rjes su dpag pa la brten te de'i don dpyod pa na 'gal (D; 'ga' P) ba mi 'khrul pa (P; ba D) can sgrub (P; bsgrub D) pa'i skyon du bśad de /; cf. NB III 114: tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ ; Ono 1987: 11 & 20, n. 48. cognition. In this case, however, the consequence of the inference based on verbal testimony can be in contradiction with one of the other consequences derived from reasons grounded in an essential connection, for it is possible that authors of scriptures, on account of their delusion, propound wrong views.
57 Accordingly, Dharmakīrti's position on antinomic reasons is summarized as follows: Antinomic reasons are possible only when in the formulation of a reason a proponent presupposes verbal testimony which is not yet determined as valid by a valid means of cognition. However, in the inference from a reason which fulfils the three conditions on the basis of an essential connection, they do not appear. This elaborate treatment of the antinomic reasons constitutes Dharmakīrti's improvement upon Dignāga's view. As mentioned in this passage, these three assumptions are not ascertained by a valid means of cognition, but are accepted only in conformity with the verbal testimony of the Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore, the reason "audibility" for the consequence "eternity" of sound is not determined as non-deviating; on the contrary, in the case of the first inference of 57 Cf. PVin III 326a5: bstan bcos byed pa rnams ni 'khrul pas (P; bas D 227a5) don rnams la raṅ bźin log par ston pa srid pa'i phyir ro //; NB III 115: śāstrakārāṇām artheṣu bhrāntyā viparītasvabhāvopasaṃhārasaṃbhavāt ǁ.
58 PVin III 327a6: 'di la ni tshad ma can ma yin pa gsum khas blaṅ bar bya ba yin te / sgra'i spyi ñid tha dad pa daṅ / dbaṅ pos rtogs par bya ba daṅ / rtag pa ste ... . the consequence "non-eternity" of sound from the reason "being produced", the required conditions for the derivation of the consequence are fulfilled on the basis of the essential connection which is already established as the ontological ground for the logical relation. Thus the reason "being produced" does not deviate as regards the derivation of its consequence "non-eternity" of sound: 59 Accordingly this (reason "audibility" for the consequence "eternity" of sound) [can]not refute [the reason] "being produced" which is arrived at on the strength of real things (vastubalāyāta).
Thus, Dharmakīrti is of the view that as long as inferences are formulated on the basis of reasons whose validity is ascertained on the basis of an essential connection, there is no possibility that some of the reasons become antinomic.
S u m m a r y
One of Dignāga's major contributions to the development of Buddhist logic is his explanation of the derivation of consequences from reasons which does not rely on the premise of real relations such as contact, inherence and so on, which are normally assumed in traditional Indian logic. However, he does not determine the basis for the establishment of the logical relation. It is Dharmakīrti who deals with this issue. He introduces an ontological relation, essential connection, as the basis for the logical relation. Since he differs in standpoint from Dignāga who assumes no ontological relation as the basis for the logical relation, he has to show how his classification of the reasons corresponds to Dignāga's.
I. As regards the correspondence, it is his main concern to interpret Dignāga's classification of the reason into nine types from the aspect of his logical system which is based on essential connection. In the case of the valid reason he shows elaborately the correspondence between Dignāga's valid reasons and his own valid reasons: the second reason in the Wheel of Reasons corresponds only to his svabhāvahetu; the eighth reason corresponds to the svabhāvahetu and the kāryahetu. According to Dharmakīrti's interpretation, in order to establish the validity of the svabhāvahetu and the kāryahetu, the valid reasons and the contradictory reasons are shown in the Wheel of Reasons. The other reasons in the Wheel of Reasons are inconclusive reasons. Of the inconclusive reasons, the first and fifth reasons are indicated in the Wheel of Reasons in order to counter the respective objections that a reason can possess only positive concomitance (kevalānvayin) and that a reason can possess only negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin). The rest of the inconclusive reasons are indicated in order to show that the exclusion of the reason from all of the vipakṣa is the principal factor for the derivation of consequences. These are Dharmakīrti's innovative interpretations.
II. In the classification of inconclusive reasons, Dharmakīrti makes use of the notion of doubt as to the reason's presence in the sapakṣa and its absence in the vipakṣa. His use of the notion of doubt as ground for the inconclusiveness of the reason is seen in his interpretation of the uncommon reason. He differs in view from Dignāga: According to Dignāga's description of the fifth reason, i.e. the uncommon reason, this reason is absent in both the sapakṣa and vipakṣa, but according to Dharmakīrti, doubt arises as to the certainty of its absence in the sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Considering this notion of doubt important for the analysis of inconclusive reasons, he reinterprets the inconclusive reasons by introducing the factor of doubt and proposes a new classification: both anvaya (the reason's presence in the sapakṣa) and vyatireka (the reason's absence in the vipakṣa) are doubtful; either anvaya or vyatireka is doubtful; vyatireka is reversed. The uncommon reason belongs to the case where both anvaya and vyatireka are doubtful. The advantage of Dharmakīrti's classification over Dignāga's is that it is possible to refute the validity of the opponent's inferences the reasons or consequences of which include objects which are beyond the domain of the senses, as for instance, the Naiyāyikas' inference of "possession of a self " from the reason "possession of breathing etc.", which, according to them, fulfils only the negative concomitance.
III. Dignāga is aware of the fact that the vyatireka, i.e. the exclusion of the reason from all of the vipakṣa, is the principal factor for the derivation of consequences, but in his description of inconclusive reasons he does not deal with the problem of how this might be demonstrated. Dharmakīrti takes it up for discussion in his interpretation of Dignāga's inconclusive reasons and insists upon the necessity of the prevalence of the vyatireka through the negation of the cases where the vyatireka is not principal. Neither the condition that the reason is present in a part of the sapakṣa, nor the condition that the same situ-ation obtains for the reason's presence in the sapakṣa and its absence in the vipakṣa is sufficient for the derivation of the consequence. Even the condition that the anvaya is principal is not sufficient because, according to Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, perception of the presence of the reason in the sapakṣa can only make known the consequence which is perceived in the present moment, not the consequence which will be perceived in the future. However, when the vyatireka is established, the derivation of the consequence is possible.
IV. Dignāga uses the reason "audibility" for the thesis "sound is eternal", the fifth reason in the Wheel of Reasons, as an example for antinomic reasons. He is of the view that antinomic reasons are a subset of the inconclusive reasons. Dharmakīrti, however, does not accept the possibility of antinomic reasons within his system of logic, which is based on essential connection. The fallacy of the antinomic reasons occurs only when a proponent formulates a reason whose validity is in conformity with verbal testimony and which is not yet recognized by a valid means of cognition. Therefore, the reason "audibility", whose validity depends on the verbal testimony of the Vaiśeṣikas, cannot refute the valid reason "being produced" for the thesis "sound is noneternal", whose validity is arrived at on the strength of real things and hence based on essential connection.
We have surveyed how Dharmakīrti interprets Dignāga's theory of the nine types of reason. Because of the contextual restriction of his description to the interpretation of Dignāga's theory, Dharmakīrti does not always expound his own logical ideas explicitly. However, he presupposes and applies them in his unique interpretation. By discerning these presupposed ideas, we can appreciate how Dharmakīrti elaborated and even improved on Dignāga's logical ideas. Thus, his interpretation can contribute to our understanding of the development of Dharmakīrti's logical ideas, a development which goes beyond Dignāga while proceeding from a shared fundamental frame of logic.
